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2016 NCHL MOOT COURT COMPETITION BEST
BRIEF
Co-sponsored by the Lawyer's Committee for Cultural
Preservation, the National Cultural Heritage Law Moot Court
Competition is the only moot court competition in the world that
focuses exclusively on cultural heritage law
issues. The Competition provides students with the opportunity to
advocate in the nuanced landscape of cultural heritage, which
addresses our past and our identity, and which has frequently
become the subject of contentious legal debates and policies. This
dynamic and growing legal field deals with the issues that arise as
our society comes to appreciate the important symbolic, historical
and emotional role that cultural heritage plays in our lives. It
encompasses several disparate areas: protection of archaeological
sites; preservation of historic structures and the built environment;
preservation of and respect for both tangible and intangible
indigenous cultural heritage; the international market in art works
and antiquities; and recovery of stolen art works.
Topics covered by the Competition in past years include:
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine
(2016); constitutional challenges to the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 (2015); statutory interpretation questions regarding the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (2014); the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (2013); the
constitutionality of the Theft of Major Artwork Act, which was
passed under the Commerce Clause (2012); the Immunity from
Seizure Act and the equitable defense of laches (2011); and the
mens rea requirement and extraterritorial application of the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (2010).
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*i QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the FSIA's expropriation exception requires the
defendant to be the same foreign sovereign that expropriated
property in violation of international law, despite no explicit
requirement in the statute.
2. Whether the act of state doctrine applies to prevent U.S.
courts from questioning the legitimacy of, and thus barring review
of the acts of the Ottoman Empire when that sovereign is no longer
extant and recognized.
*ii PARTIES To THE PROCEEDING
The Petitioner in this case is the British Museum, a foreign
instrumentality currently possessing the property at issue. The
Respondent is the Acropolis Museum, the party seeking
jurisdiction and seeks return of that property.
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The order and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit is unreported. Acropolis Museum
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2015). The order and opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of DePaulia is also unreported. Acropolis
Museum v. British Museum, No. 13 X 129, slip op. at 1, (W.D.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
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*2 STATUTORY PROVISION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L.
94-583, §§ 1602 et seq., 90 Stat. 2891-98 (codified in various
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (1976) ("FSIA") is a legislative act defining
the jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign
states. The FSIA's general exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of foreign states (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1605) are
reproduced in Appendix A of this Brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth Circuit as to whether the case was properly dismissed
under either the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act or under the
application of the act of state doctrine is a question of law and is
therefore reviewed de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
558 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Facts
The Parthenon temple was the pinnacle of Athens and
represented "artistic excellence and classical purity." [R. 4.]
Constructed between 447 and 432 B.C.E. near the summit of the
Acropolis, the temple's exterior was constructed and adorned with
sculptural reliefs placed in the spaces between columns (called
metopes), in the pediments, and around the upper walls of the
inner temple (called the cella). [R. 4-5.] From the mid-eighteenth
and through the nineteenth centuries, publications about the
Parthenon propagated interest in the temple and its sculptural
works. [R. 6.] French architect Le Roy published the first detailed
study of the Parthenon in 1758. [R. 6.] James Stuart and Nicholas
Revett later published The Antiquities of Athens in 1787, which
included drawings of the Parthenon. [R. 6.] These studies
inspired cultured *3 Europeans, who then sought sculptural
fragments from the Parthenon when the publications indicated that
the sculptures were quickly deteriorating. [R. 6.]
2016]
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Thomas Bruce, the seventh Earl of Elgin, was among the
interested Europeans who gained an interest in sculptural art. [R.
7.] Lord Elgin arrived as the British ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire in 1799. [R. 6.] Lord Elgin brought artists and mold
makers with him to draw and plaster casts of the Parthenon's
Classical sculptural and architectural fragments described in the
1758 and 1787 studies. [R. 7.] He sought to bring casts of these
sculptures back to England to improve English arts and society.
[R. 7.] Although this was his original goal, Lord Elgin actually
took several original pieces. [R. 7.]
The sculptures that Lord Elgin acquired between 1801 and
1803 ("the Sculptures") contained an abundance of cultural
significance. [R. 4-7.] The Sculptures were taken from various
locations throughout the Parthenon building, originating from the
metopes, pediments, and cella. [R. 4.] The Parthenon contained
ninety-two metopes that depicted mythic battle scenes such as the
sack of Troy, the battle with the Amazons, the battle between the
gods and the giants, and the battle between the Centaurs and the
Lapiths. [R. 4.] The east pediment depicted the birth of Athena,
and the west pediment displayed Athena's victory in her contest
with Poseidon by which she became the patron goddess of Athens.
[R. 4-5.] The cella exhibited an Ionic frieze depicting a procession.
[R. 5.] The Sculptures adorned the Parthenon and remained in tact
throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods. [R. 5.] The
building served as a church under the Byzantine Empire, then a
Roman Catholic Church under the rule of Venice, and finally a
mosque during the Ottoman Empire. [R. 5.] In 1687, the central
part of the Parthenon's structure was destroyed when the
Venetians initiated an explosion. [R. 5.] As a result, the
Venetians inflicted a significant amount of damage on the
structures within the temple when *4 removing some of the
remaining sculptures. [R. 5-6.] They also destroyed sculptures
within the west pediment of the Parthenon. [R. 6.]
Lord Elgin acquired at least seven of the metopes, twenty
slabs of the frieze, and almost all the surviving figures of the
pediments. [R. 7.] When removing these pieces of art, Lord Elgin
caused damage to the surrounding architectural elements of the
structure. [R. 7.] Though legitimate title is still debated, Lord
Elgin was presumed to have gained possession and ownership of
12
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the Sculptures through a series of permissions, known as firmans.
[R. 7.] The Ottoman Sultan granted these firmans to Lord Elgin in
appreciation for the British defeat of the French at the naval battle
of Aboukir. [R. 8.] These firmans were important in determining
whether Elgin had legitimate title, as it was arguable what the
firmans actually permitted Lord Elgin to do. [R. 8.] The original
firmans did not survive, but an Italian translation of the second
firman remains. [R. 8.] The second translated firman was
submitted during a Parliamentary hearing in 1816 to determine
whether the British nation should acquire the Sculptures. [R. 8.]
Lord Elgin eventually sold the Sculptures to the United
Kingdom Parliament upon his bankruptcy. [R. 7-8.] The United
Kingdom Parliament transferred the Sculptures to the British
Museum, where they remain today. [R. 8.] Now, both the
Acropolis Museum and the British Museum assert rightful
ownership of the Sculptures. [R. 2.]
Procedural History
The Acropolis Museum filed a complaint in the District
Court for the Western District of DePaulia, alleging that the
Sculptures were taken in violation of international law and sought
restitution of the Sculptures and damages. [R. 2.] The British
Museum moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [R. 2.] For purposes of this motion, the
parties conceded that the Ottoman Empire, not the United
Kingdom, was the foreign *5 sovereign that expropriated the
Sculptures. [R. 9.] The British Museum argued that United States
courts do not have jurisdiction under the FSIA and the act of state
doctrine. [R. 2.]
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
Acropolis Museum's claim is barred under the FSIA because the
United Kingdom possesses did not expropriate the Sculptures. [R.
2.] The district court also dismissed the complaint on the
applicability of the act of state doctrine. [R. 2.] The district court
found that it could not question the actions of the Ottoman Empire
in granting permission to Lord Elgin to take the Sculptures from its
territory. [R. 2-3.]
2016]
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The Acropolis Museum appealed the district court's
decision on both the FSIA and act of state doctrine issues. [R. 3.]
Disagreeing with the district court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit reversed and remanded on both
issues. [R. 3.] The Twelfth Circuit stated that "nothing in the
plain language of the FSIA requires that the foreign sovereign
against whom suit is brought be the sovereign that allegedly took
the property in violation of international law." [R. 9.]
Additionally, the Twelfth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine
does not bar further consideration of the merits of the case,
because "there can be no question that the Republic of Turkey is a
radically different government than its predecessor." [R. 22-23.]
The British Museum appealed the decision of the Twelfth
Circuit, and this Court granted its petition for writ of certiorari on
November 20, 2015.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both challenges to the Acropolis Museum's claims for
restitution and damages require this Court to affirm the decision of
the Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals.
First, the FSIA's expropriation exception provides no
requirement that the defendant be the same sovereign that
expropriated the cultural property in question. This Court requires
that the plain language of a text be considered first. If the
language is conclusive and absent clearly *6 expressed intent
showing otherwise, the statute is unambiguous and the inquiry
ends. The text of the expropriation exception is clear: there is no
overt requirement specifying that the defendant must have
expropriated property for the exception to apply. This Court
should not institute such a requirement because doing so would
improperly contravene the text of the statute.
Additionally, even if this Court resorts to legislative intent,
other canons of statutory interpretation show no intention to limit
jurisdiction to only defendant sovereigns that took the property at
issue. Congress intentionally placed the phrase "by the foreign
sovereign" in neighboring statutes but did not include the same in
the expropriation exception. This shows Congress intentionally
omitted the phrase from the expropriation exception.
14
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Congressional reports indicate Congress' preference not to limit
the takings to foreign states that participated in the expropriations.
The FSIA's expropriation exception also remains consistent with
common law and does not require a narrow reading. Therefore,
the expropriation exception should apply here to maintain
jurisdiction over the British Museum.
Second, this Court should not apply the act of state doctrine
because the Ottoman Empire is no longer extant and recognized.
The act of state doctrine precludes courts from inquiring into the
validity of acts of a foreign sovereign committed in its own
territory. The balance has been shifted since the Republic of
Turkey has come into power and the Ottoman Empire is no longer
extant and recognized. The Republic of Turkey is a vastly
different regime than the Ottoman Empire in both time and
circumstance. Harm to foreign policy is minimal and the judicial
branch's adjudication would not cause embarrassment or interfere
with foreign relations.
The doctrine is flexible and application of the act of state
doctrine allows courts to use wide discretion. In assessing whether
to apply the act of state doctrine, this Court employs a balancing
test, which accounts for three main considerations. First,
consensus of law establishes *7 that courts generally
return cultural property from the country in which it was taken,
recognizing forced takings were unjustified under international
law. Second, disruption in continuity of foreign affairs is
minimal. Third, the Ottoman Empire's allowance of Lord Elgin to
seize the Sculptures was more attune to a commercial
transaction between private parties than a formal governmental
action. All factors weigh in favor of a court's adjudication of this
case. Therefore, the act of state doctrine should be rejected, and
this case should be heard on the merits.
2016]
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ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY BECAUSE THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FsIA's EXPROPRIATION
EXCEPTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A DEFENDANT FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN To BE THE SAME SOVEREIGN ALLEGED To
HAVE EXPROPRIATED THE PROPERTY.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq., provides the only basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States courts. Republic
ofAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004). Under the FSIA,
foreign sovereigns are immune from jurisdiction of state and
federal courts within the United States unless an exception applies.
28 U.S.C. § 1604; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 488 (1983). Subject matter and personal jurisdiction in
each claim brought against a foreign sovereign relies upon an
enumerated FSIA exception being met. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
493-94. If any enumerated exception applies, jurisdiction exists
and courts hold the foreign sovereign liable in the same manner
and extent it does a private individual under similar circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 1606. The FSIA lists six general exceptions to
immunity, one of which is the expropriation exception at issue
here. 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
Under the expropriation exception, foreign states are not
immune from jurisdiction of courts within the United States in all
cases involving "rights in property taken in violation of
international law." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Section 1605(a)(3)
provides:
*8 A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case... in which rights in property
taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state....
110
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The expropriation exception has three distinct
requirements: (1) the property at issue must be taken in violation
of international law; (2) the property must be owned or operated
by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; and (3) the
agency or instrumentality must be engaged in commercial activity
in the United States. Id.; see 1 Alexandra Darraby, Art,
Architecture, and Museum Law, § 6:156 (2014). Here, the parties
conceded that the Ottoman Empire, not the United Kingdom
expropriated the Sculptures. [R. 9.] However, this concession
does not provide the United Kingdom or its instrumentalities
immunity from jurisdiction in the United States.
A. The Language of Section 1605(a)(3) Has a Plain and
Unambiguous Meaning.
The FSIA's expropriation exception does not explicitly
mandate that a foreign sovereign against which suit is brought be
the sovereign alleged to have taken property in violation of
international law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). The Twelfth
Circuit properly relied on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Cassirer
v. Kingdom of Spain to find that the expropriation exception
applies when a foreign state against which a claim is made did not
expropriate the property at issue. 616 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir.
2010). This Court should look to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Cassirer, as it is the only circuit court to address the narrow issue
presented here.
Reliance on dicta from the Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit is
incorrect, as these courts addressed requirements of the
expropriation exception that are not at issue here. See Vencedora
Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984); see Agudas Chasidei
Chabad of U.S. v. Russ. Fed'n, 528 F.3d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For
example, the Fifth Circuit in Vencedora addressed the second
requirement of the *9 expropriation exception, whether property
was "owned or operated" by an instrumentality of the foreign
sovereign. Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 204. There, a vessel owned by
a Panamanian corporation caught fire while transporting crude oil
near the coasts of Algeria and Sicily. Id. at 196. An Algerian
20161
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tugboat rendered assistance to the vessel and transported it to an
Algerian port rather than a Sicilian port, contrary to the
Panamanian vessel's managing agent. Id. The Fifth Circuit
clarified that "it is not clear whether property was 'taken in
violation of international law"' and that the district court only
found the expropriation exception inapplicable because the
Algeria's instrumentality did not "own or operate" the vessel. Id.
at 204. The court found that the defendant instrumentality of the
Algerian government did not "own or operate" the vessel at issue
because it did not assume control and use it for the benefit of the
Algerian government. Id.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed an issue not in contention here.
The court in Vencedora addressed the "owned or operated"
provision within the second requirement of the expropriation
exception. The issue properly before this Court pertains to the first
requirement of the expropriation exception-whether property was
taken in violation of international law. Further, the Algerian
instrumentality in Vencedora was the same foreign sovereign
alleged to have expropriated the vessel. Id. at 196. Here, the
defendant instrumentality, the British Museum, is not the
sovereign alleged to have expropriated the Sculptures. Moreover,
there is no dispute over whether the Ottoman Empire "owned or
operated" the Sculptures. Vencedora 's analysis is therefore not
relevant to the issues before this Court.
1. Section 1605(a)(3) does not affirmatively require the
defendant foreign sovereign to have taken property at
issue.
When determining the meaning of a statute, courts must
regard the plain language as conclusive if the statutory language is
unambiguous and absent clearly expressed legislative intent
showing otherwise. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20
(1983); see CBS Inc. v. *10 PrimeTime24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d
1217, 1222 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (finding no ambiguity in the phrase
"any termination," the court relied on the common usage and
ordinary meaning of the terms). "If the statutory language is plain,
[courts] must enforce it according to its terms." King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). When construing the meaning and
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scope of a statute, courts examine the text of the statute rather than
"psychoanalyzing those who enacted it." Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 271-72 (2000) (quoting Bank One Chicago, N.A. v.
Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Courts first look
to the language employed by Congress to determine whether it has
a plain and unambiguous meaning. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas
(Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2007).
This Court should adopt the reasoning of Cassirer to
comport with the language of Section 1605(a)(3) and to avoid
misconstruing the plain meaning of the expropriation exception.
In Cassirer, an agent of the Nazi government confiscated a
Pissarro painting. 616 F.3d at 1022-23. Various art dealers sold
the Pissarro painting several times before the Thyssen-Bornemisza
Museum displayed it in Madrid, Spain in 2000. Id. At this time,
the plaintiff, heir to the original owner, discovered the location of
the painting and filed a claim against the Kingdom of Spain and
the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation ("Foundation")
under the FSIA. Id. The Foundation filed a motion to dismiss
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, among other reasons.
Id. at 1024. Spain and the Foundation argued the expropriation
exception applies only to foreign states that expropriated the
property and not to later purchasers. Id. at 1028. Unconvinced,
the Ninth Circuit found no support for this in the statutory text of
Section 1605(a)(3). Id. Rather, the court found that a literal
reading of the section connotes "any foreign state" may
expropriate the property for the exception to apply. Id.
*11 Section 1605(a)(3) does not state that property must
have been taken in violation of international law "by the foreign
state being sued." See Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1028. Rather, the
statute merely provides an exception to sovereign immunity in
cases "in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). The plain
language of the statute does not include a requirement that the
defendant foreign sovereign must have expropriated property.
Imposing such a requirement would improperly contravene the
text of Section 1605(a)(3) by mandating an additional requirement
not present in the statute. Moreover, it would ascribe meaning
2016]
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other than the text's literal meaning, requiring this Court to
improperly rewrite the text of the statute and "put words in
Congress' mouth." See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457,
1461-62 (9th Cir. 1995). Barring jurisdiction because the Ottoman
Empire, and not the United Kingdom, expropriated the Sculptures
would contravene the plain language of Section 1605(a)(3). The
plain language does not impose this additional requirement, so
Petitioner cannot escape jurisdiction. Requiring the United
Kingdom or its instrumentalities to have expropriated the issue
improperly rewrites the text of Section 1605(a)(3).
2. Congress' use ofpassive voice in Section 1605(a)(3)
focuses on the event of expropriation rather than the
specific foreign state that expropriates.
When analyzing the literal meaning of a statute, this Court
has deemed Congress' use of the passive voice as a grammatical
tool emphasizing the occurrence of an event over the identity of an
actor. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572-74 (2009);
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2007). In Dean, this
Court observed Congress' use of passive voice in a criminal
enhancement statute and held that liability under the statute does
not require a separate showing of intent. 556 U.S. at 572. The text
of the statute at issue in Dean provides that a defendant must be
sentenced to a minimum of ten years imprisonment "if the firearm
is discharged." 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
This Court stated, "[t]he passive *12 voice focuses on an event
that occurs without respect to a specific actor, and therefore
without respect to any actor's intent or culpability." Dean, 556
U.S. at 572. "It is whether something happened-not how or why
it happened-that matters." Id. Looking only at the statutory text,
this Court found there to be no intent requirement in the
enhancement statute. Id. at 572-74. Straying from the text of the
statute and implying an intent requirement would contort and
stretch the statutory language. Id. at 574.
Along with Dean, this Court in Watson v. United States
noted the significance the passive voice carries in determining a
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol26/iss2/2
NCHL MOOT COURT BRIEF
statute's meaning. See 552 U.S. at 81. Analyzing the same
enhancement statute in Dean, this Court highlighted that Congress'
use of the passive voice in Section 924(d)(1) shows "agnosticism.
• . about who does the using" and indicates an increased level of
generality. Watson, 552 U.S. at 81-82. Use of the passive voice
emphasizes the event at issue rather than the identity of the actor.
This Court should apply a similar analysis here because the
text of Section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA includes the passive voice
in one of its key requirements. According to the expropriation
exception, foreign states are subject to jurisdiction of courts within
the United States in any case "in which rights in property taken in
violation of international law are in
issue . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (emphasis added). Here,
Congress' use of passive voice places emphasis on the event of
expropriation and disregards the identity of state actor alleged to
have expropriated the property. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1028 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009)).
This grammatical choice indicates the property at issue may be
taken by "any foreign state," not just the defendant foreign state.
Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1028 (emphasis in original). Thus, the
defendant foreign state-here, the United Kingdom-need not be
the sovereign alleged to have taken property at issue for the
exception to apply.
3. *13 Since there is no ambiguity in the statute's text, using
legislative history to contravene the plain meaning of
Section 1605(a)(3) is improper.
When analyzing the meaning of a statute, courts turn to
legislative history only when there is ambiguity in the statutory
language. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. It is improper for this
Court to consider the FSIA's legislative history because there is no
ambiguity in the text of Section 1605(a)(3). See Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at
1224. Section 1605(a)(3) purposefully omits the language "by the
foreign sovereign" while including it in surrounding provisions of
the FSIA. This omission does not allude to ambiguity in the
statute but rather demonstrates an intentional action taken by the
legislature. Further, use of passive voice in Section 1605(a)(3)
2016]
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focuses on the event of expropriation rather than the foreign
sovereign performing that act. A literal reading of the text
unambiguously shows that there is no additional requirement that
the defendant foreign state had expropriated the property at issue.
Therefore, the Twelfth Circuit properly found that Section
1605(a)(3) does not require Petitioner be the foreign sovereign that
expropriated the Sculptures.
Moreover, the legislative history of Section 1605(a)(3)
must not be used to contradict its plain meaning or to create
ambiguity in the text. See CBS Inc, 245 F.3d at 1222-24. This
Court "[does] not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear." Ratzclafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147
(1994). Here, the Twelfth Circuit's dissent improperly relies on
the FSIA's purpose of granting sovereign immunity only to foreign
states' public acts to create ambiguity in the statutory text and
contravene its literal meaning. The Twelfth Circuit's dissent is
therefore misguided because it strays from the framework of
statutory interpretation provided by this Court.
B. *14 Even If This Court Finds the Language of Section
1605(a)(3) Ambiguous, Other Canons of Statutory
Interpretation Indicate a Defendant Foreign State Need
Not Have Expropriated the Property at Issue.
A statute's meaning may become evident when situated
within a wider context, requiring courts to analyze the language in
its overall statutory scheme. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. Even if
this Court finds Section 1605(a)(3) ambiguous, its broader
placement within the FSIA and its legislative history support a
finding that Petitioner need not be the foreign sovereign alleged to
have expropriated the Sculptures to obtain jurisdiction.
1. Congress' use of the phrase "by the foreign state" in
neighboring provisions indicates intent for courts to obtain
jurisdiction, regardless of which foreign state expropriated
the property at issue.
The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterias
supports a finding that it is not necessary for the defendant foreign
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sovereign to have taken the property at issue under the
expropriation exception. Under the doctrine of expressio unius,
this Court "[has] long held that '[where] Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."' Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894
(2013) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30
(1997)).
Congress focused on the identity of the defendant foreign
state in other sections of the FSIA by including the explicit
language "by the foreign state." See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1). The
expropriation exception is one of six general exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). Along with the
expropriation exception, two additional general exceptions
explicitly denote that an action must be taken "by the foreign
sovereign." Under the commercial activity exception, a foreign
state is not immune from jurisdiction of United States courts when
an action "is based upon a *15 commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state . . . ." 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2) (emphasis added). Another general exception within
the FSIA provides for jurisdiction in cases brought "to enforce an
agreement made by the foreign state... or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)
(emphasis added). Apart from the FSIA's general exceptions in
Section 1605(a), the FSIA also permits attachment of property
owned by a foreign sovereign liable for terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. §
1610(f)(1). That statute explicitly refers to property "expropriated
or seized by the foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1).
Each of these neighboring provisions includes an explicit
requirement that the defendant foreign state took a particular
action to be liable under the statute. Such a requirement is lacking
in the expropriation exception. The inclusion of the phrase "by the
foreign state" in surrounding sections of the FSIA demonstrates
that Congress intended, under Section 1605(a)(3), for United
States courts to obtain jurisdiction regardless of which state
expropriated the property at issue.
2016]
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2. The legislative history of the FSIA reflects that Congress
did not intend to waive immunity of a foreign state only if
the state itself was alleged to have expropriated property.
Nothing in the FSIA's legislative history indicates
Congress meant something other than what it stated in the
statutory text. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1029-40. The plain meaning
of Section 1605(a)(3) does not conflict with legislative intent
because it requires a foreign sovereign either to possess the
property at issue within the United States or engage in commercial
activity within the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
Congress enacted the FSIA to clarify the rules judges apply in
resolving immunity claims and to eliminate political pressures
from the determination of. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 699. Congress
also intended for courts to grant sovereign immunity for a foreign
sovereign's public acts but not its commercial acts. H.R. Rep. No.
94-1487 (1976).
*16 The FSIA's legislative history does not indicate a
defendant foreign sovereign must be the same foreign sovereign
that expropriated property at issue. Congress stated in its
concurrent House Report, "[t]he term 'taken in violation of
international law' would include the nationalization or
expropriation of property without payment of the prompt adequate
and effective compensation required by international law. It
would also include takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in
nature." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 (1976). These statements did not
specify a specific defendant sovereign. Rather, it characterized the
taking by usage of the third person and mirrors the language of
Section 1605(a)(3). Congress included a general category of
"takings which are arbitrary and discriminatory in nature" as a
violation of international law. This inclusion represents Congress'
broad intent and does not limit jurisdiction to foreign states that
conducted the takings. Therefore, nothing in the FSIA's
legislative history runs contrary to the statutory text of Section
1605(a)(3).
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3. Section 1605(a)(3) should not be strictly construed because
it is not in derogation of common law.
Courts construe statutes strictly when they are in
derogation of common law, unless statutory intent to the contrary
is evident. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993);
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108
(1991); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
Statutes invading the common law are read with a presumption
favoring long established principles. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534.
Here, this Court should not strictly construe the FSIA's
expropriation exception because it is not in derogation of common
law and there is no statutory intent to the contrary. Rather, the
FSIA may be interpreted broadly. See generally Kern v. Jeppesen
Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating "[t]he
FSIA is interpreted broadly" when deciding whether a foreign
manufacturer was a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction).
*17 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity developed
under the common law long before Congress adopted the FSIA.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
487. Beginning in 1812 with this Court's decision in Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), courts extended
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns "as a matter of grace and
comity." Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. Following Schooner
Exchange, courts developed a two-step process to resolve
sovereign immunity disputes. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311 (citing
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945)). First, a
diplomatic representative of the foreign sovereign had the
opportunity to request a "suggestion of immunity" from the State
Department. Id. Second, the State Department then made a
determination on that request. Id. at 311-12. If the State
Department granted the request, the district court surrendered its
jurisdiction. Id. at 312. If denied, the district court would make
the sovereign immunity determination by looking to "whether the
ground of immunity is one which is the established policy of [the
State Department] to recognize." Id. (quoting Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)).
In the 1952 "Tate Letter," the State Department adopted a
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity such that the judicial
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branch, rather than the executive, would make determinations of
foreign sovereign immunity. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976). Around this time,
two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity existed: (1) the
absolute theory where a foreign state must consent to jurisdiction
in court; and (2) the restrictive theory where foreign states have
immunity for their public acts but not their private acts. Altmann,
541 U.S. at 690. Both concepts were "widely and firmly
established" around 1952 before the State Department announced
it would apply the restrictive theory. Id. From 1952 to 1976,
courts inconsistently applied sovereign immunity. Id. Political
pressures and *18 considerations led the State Department to file
suggestions of immunity when it would not have otherwise been
available under the restrictive theory. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690.
The FSIA halted this practice in 1976 and codified the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity to provide clarity and uniformity in
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Id. at 691.
The FSIA was not in derogation of the common law at the
time of its enactment. When Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976,
the State Department had already announced its adoption of the
restrictive theory. Id. at 690. The restrictive theory aligns with the
FSJA, as the FSIA's findings and declaration of purpose state,
"[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities
are concerned . .. ." 28 U.S.C. § 1602. The FSIA codifies the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity which the State
Department adopted fourteen years prior. Therefore, the FSJA was
not in derogation of the common law when enacted in 1976.
Rather, it extended the restrictive theory and provided for clearer
guidelines free from political considerations. This Court should
not interpret the expropriation exception narrowly by requiring
Petitioner to be the same foreign sovereign that expropriated the
Sculptures, as the FSIA was not in derogation of the common law
at the time of its enactment. Imposing such a requirement results
in an interpretation of the expropriation exception that
unnecessarily limits the court's jurisdiction over foreign states.
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR RESPONDENT'S
CLAIM BECAUSE THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY Is A VASTLY
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DIFFERENT REGIME THAN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THIS
LITIGATION DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH'S HAND IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
The FSIA and the act of state doctrine are independent
concerns. Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States,
561 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Unlike the FSIA, the
act of state doctrine is only subject to discretionary application and
courts are given wider discretion in their act of state rulings. Id.
The act of state doctrine "precludes the courts of *19 this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts [that] a
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own
territory." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401. In Underhill v. Hernandez,
this Court circumscribed the act of state doctrine's framework for
the first time. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). In Underhill, this Court
stated that sovereign states must respect the authority and laws of
their counterparts. Id. Each sovereign abides by its own laws and
regulations such that United States courts will not sit in judgment
on the acts of another country when that country's actions take
place within its own borders. Id.
In determining the applicability of the act of state doctrine,
this Court has taken a flexible stance and has issued certain criteria
in order for the doctrine to apply as a defense on the merits.
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). The
criteria require that (1) the taking must be by a foreign
government; (2) the taking must have occurred within the
territorial limitations of that government; (3) the foreign sovereign
government must be extant and recognized by the United States at
the time of suit; and (4) the taking must not be in violation of a
treaty obligation. Id.; Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (NY Sup.
Ct. 1966). The only factor at issue in this case is whether the
Ottoman Empire is extant and recognized, notwithstanding its
transition to the Republic of Turkey. [R. 18.] The essential
principle of the doctrine is whether a court's adjudication of a
sovereign's action would interfere with foreign affairs. See
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427. Assessing whether adjudication
touches upon foreign affairs "requires a balancing of interests,"
and the act of state doctrine should not be invoked if the essential
foreign affairs principle is not infringed upon by the judiciary.
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Bigio v. Coca-Cola, 239 F.3d 440, 452 (2d Cir. 2000). The third
factor from Sabbatino shifts the balance to weigh against the
doctrine's application if the government that perpetuated the act is
no longer extant and recognized. When *20 a regime no longer
exists for its past actions to be questioned, foreign affairs are less
likely to be infringed upon. Id. at 428.
A. Since the Ottoman Empire Is No Longer Extant and
Recognized, the Balancing Test Weighs Against
Application of the Act of State Doctrine.
1. Adjudication of this claim will not interfere with foreign
affairs because the Ottoman Empire has not existed in over
a century.
While the act of state doctrine precludes inquiring into the
validity of public acts by a sovereign done within its own territory,
that rule is significantly limited in cases where the sovereign is no
longer extant and recognized. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Rather
than codify an all-encompassing rule, this Court noted that the
doctrine's applicability to a given case can shift if the government
that perpetuated the challenged act is no longer in existence. Id.;
See Chabad, 528 F.3d at 954 ("whatever flexibility Sabbatino
preserves is at its apex where the taking government has been
succeeded by a radically different regime."). When the prior
regime no longer exists, the act of state doctrine is not applicable
and a court will adjudicate matters concerning a sovereign's prior
action. Id. This Court noted that the extant and recognized prong
is significant because the political interest that the United States
has in adjudicating the matter is "measurably altered" when the
government that committed an act is no longer in existence. Id.
This Court has rejected the notion that a court of this
country may not adjudicate a matter of another state, even when
that state has ceased to exist. WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). In WS.
Kirkpatrick, this Court reiterated Sabbatino's doctrine. Id. "[I]n
Sabbatino, we observed that sometimes, even though the validity
of the act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory is called
into question, the policies underlying the act of state doctrine may
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol26/iss2/2
NCHL MOOT COURT BRIEF
not justify its application." Id. Where there has been a significant
change in government, courts have found that the third prong of
the Sabbatino criteria *21 may not be met and the act of state
doctrine is not applied. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola, 239 F.3d at 453
(overturning lower court decision because the court did not
consider that the Nasser regime was succeeded by a different
sovereign); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, 816 (1966) (holding
the act of state doctrine did not apply because the Third Reich was
neither extant nor recognized by the government at the time of the
trial but rather collapsed with its surrender in 1945); Republic of
Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing
considerations for application of the doctrine were less compelling
because the challenged actions involved a government that was no
longer in power).
Here, the disruption in continuity of United States foreign
affairs is minimal at best, since the Ottoman Empire was abolished
over one hundred years ago. When a sovereign has been replaced
by a radically different regime that was not responsible for the
expropriation, the danger of a court interfering with the
executive's conduct in foreign policy decreases and the act of state
doctrine is less applicable. See Bigio, 239 F.3d at 453.
2. The Ottoman Empire's transition to the Republic of Turkey
marks a significant change that renders the act of state
doctrine inapplicable under Sabbatino.
A sovereign is no longer extant and recognized by the
United States when there is a significant change in government. In
Bigio, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it
granted the defendant's act of state doctrine defense. Id. Plaintiffs
were owners of Bigio & Co., seized by the Egyptian government
when President Nasser sequestered and nationalized the plaintiffs'
property. Id. The Bigio complaint alleged that Coca-Cola
purchased the property knowing it was seized unlawfully. Id.
Coca-Cola argued that the district court should abstain from
hearing the case pursuant to the principles of the act of state
doctrine. Id. at 446.
*22 When considering the applicability of the act of state
doctrine, the Second Circuit considered this Court's analysis in
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Sabbatino that the balance might be shifted if the government that
perpetuated the act is no longer in existence. Id. at 453. The
Second Circuit weighed heavily on the issue when it stated, "there
is little doubt that the Egyptian government that is now in power is
far removed in time and circumstance from that which seized the
Bigios' property. The expropriation took place thirty-four or more
years ago; President Nasser has been dead for thirty years." Id.
Most notably, the court highlighted that interfering with an
Executive's conduct of foreign policy is more dangerous when the
act is that of the current government. Id. The Second Circuit
characterized the new Egyptian government as far different from
the old regime in time and circumstance, ultimately holding that
the act of state defense did not apply because the taking and
President Nasser's death both occurred more than thirty years
prior. Id.
Here, the act of state doctrine does not apply as a defense
because the Ottoman Empire has undergone a significant change in
government and is no longer extant and recognized by the United
States. Ottoman rule ended over one hundred years ago. [R. 22.]
The symbolic end to its reign is evidenced by the terms of the
Sykes-Picot Treaty at the conclusion of World War I. [R. 16.] At
the time of the treaty, the Ottoman Empire was carved up and the
Republic of Turkey succeeded the Ottoman Empire in 1923 and
became a recognized sovereign. [R. 16.] Similar to Bigio, the
Turkish government that replaced the Ottoman Empire is vastly
different in both time and circumstance. Furthermore, the facts of
this case are even more heightened than those in Bigio. In Bigio,
the Nasser regime had been disintegrated for thirty-four years by
the time litigation commenced. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire
was extinguished for over one hundred years at the time of this
litigation. The period from the Republic of Turkey's succession of
the Ottoman Empire surpasses the period from the Egyptian
government's succession of the *23 Nasser regime by nearly
seventy years. The amount of time that passes following a
transition in government is compelling because it often denotes
how closely an old regime still manifests itself in the new one. It
would be hard-pressed to say that the new Turkish government is
similar to the Ottoman regime, as over a hundred years has elapsed
since its demise. During that time, the Ottoman Sultan who
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allegedly issued firmans to Lord Elgin, has long since passed
away. Moreover, none of the firmans that the Sultan allegedly
issued to Lord Elgin survive today.
While the issue of whether Lord Elgin received valid title
to the Sculptures is not relevant to the act of state doctrine
question, it remains a valid and accurate measure of both the time
and circumstance in which an old regime no longer exists.
Furthermore, the Turkish government did not keep the firmans as
records of their own. This shows that the Turkish government has
created a new system of government and bureaucracy vastly
different from the Ottoman Empire's. As in Bigio, litigating this
case on its merits would not upset with the executive branch's
control of foreign conduct because a great deal of time has passed
since the Ottoman rule. Not adjudicating the matter would
legitimize an old foreign regime that is no longer extant and
recognized. The Ottoman Empire, its rulers, and firmans granted
by an old ruler, are no longer in existence. On par with this
Court's Sabbatino analysis, the balance must be shifted since the
former government is no longer in power and the act of state
doctrine does not apply.
B. As Shown by Sabbatino, a Flexible Application of the Act
of State Doctrine Best Facilitates the Foreign Relation
Policies at Stake.
While some courts have taken a hard-lined approach to the
FSIA, courts are given discretion to apply the act of state doctrine
without stringent guidelines. See Asociacion de Reclamantes, 561
F. Supp. at 1198 ("Sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine are generally independent concerns, and the former is
binding while the latter is subject to discretionary application.").
This Court has highlighted the wider latitude and maneuverability
of the act *24 of state doctrine. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(explaining that the "doctrine demands a case-by-case
analysis.. .tempered by common sense.").
Rather than establishing an all-encompassing rule, the
balancing approach in Sabbatino sought to (1) consider the degree
of international law concerning the legality of the sovereign act,
(2) determine the importance of the issue's implications in foreign
20161
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affairs, and (3) establish whether the regime that perpetuated the
act still exists. Id. In weighing these considerations, there is a
presumption that courts will decide whether the resolution of the
matter is the proper function of the judicial or executive branch.
Id. Sabbatino's flexible approach and the proper application of the
act of state doctrine "requires a balancing of interests" and it
"should not be invoked if the policies underlying the doctrine do
not justify its application." Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F.
Supp. 2d 517, 533-34 (NY Dist. Ct. 2013) (quoting Bigio, 239
F.3d at 452). Those policy concerns include comity and separation
of powers. Margaret A. Miles, Judicial Balancing of Foreign
Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under The Act of State
Doctrine, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 327 (1983). This judicial balancing
allows judges to evaluate the facts of each case in light of the
policies behind the doctrine. Id. Courts have discretion to waive
the doctrine if the case is not likely to impact international
relations or "embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of
foreign relations." Id. at 427-28.
Lower courts have also followed the flexible balancing
approach, adhering to this Court's guidance. The Ninth Circuit
reiterated this Court's approach that the act of state doctrine is
"supple, flexible, ad hoc." Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1361. This flexible
approach allows the act of state doctrine to be applied narrowly
and expands the foreign government's actions that a United States
court can evaluate. It does not provide an exception for cases and
controversies that may embarrass foreign affairs. WS. Kirkpatrick
& Co., 493 U.S. at 409.
*25 The balancing test is vital to the act of state doctrine
framework since it takes all aspects of the dispute into
consideration. When assessing whether to apply the act of state
doctrine, a court will come to a more comprehensive decision if it
is able to weigh every component rather than one single factor. By
following this formula, a court will have greater means to assess
whether the adjudication would interfere with foreign affairs.
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1. A court should decide the Sculptures' ownership rights
since international law facilitating the return of
expropriated art is well-documented.
As stated by this Court, "the greater the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. When
courts come to a consensus surrounding a particular area of the
law, courts can focus more attentively on the application of that
agreed-upon principle, rather than worry over the law's intrusion
into the executive's sphere of foreign affairs. Id. This falls
directly in line with the principle that courts should follow
established law and avoid reaching a decision inconsistent with
national interest or international justice. Id.
The Twelfth Circuit's holding aligns with the established
principle that historical art taken from a country, which the
expropriating sovereign no longer controls, is returned to its
country of origin. This historical trend is grounded in the
congruency of the United States's executive and judicial branches,
effectually making the principle well-established. See Bernstein v.
N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d. Cir. 1954); see Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804. Two
cases following the Third Reich demonstrate the agreement
between the executive and judicial branches that expropriated
property should be returned when wrongfully taken by a regime
that has not passed a formal law. Donald T. Kramer, Annotation,
Modern Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (1972).
Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche raised the issue
of whether the act of state doctrine barred Bernstein from *26
recovering damages from the Nazi-mandated conversion of stock
interest in his company. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). There, the
Second Circuit initially held that it would not rule on the validity
of the German government's acts during the Nazi regime, applying
the act of state doctrine defense. Id. at 73. However, the State
Department's issuance of the Tate Letter stated that government's
policy was "to undo forced transfers." Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376.
Relying on the Tate Letter, the Second Circuit amended its order
and declined to extend the act of state doctrine. Id. This amended
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order now allowed the court to hear the merits of cases involving
the Nazi Regime. Id. In light of the Executive Policy in the
official letter, the court "[struck] out all the restraints based on the
inability of the court to pass on the acts of officials in Germany
during the period in question." Id. In Menzel, the plaintiff sought
to recover her painting seized by an agency of the Nazi Party after
she fled from Belgium. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809. The court rightfully
assumed jurisdiction and rejected that the painting was seized
lawfully by an occupying power. Id. at 815. The court held the
act of state doctrine inapplicable because the Third Reich
collapsed in 1945 and was neither extant nor recognized at the
time of trial. Id. at 816-17.
The consensus and codification of the law-stating that
forced transfers during the Nazi regime are not upheld by many
U.S. courts-applies to the forced taking of the Sculptures from
the Parthenon by the Ottoman Empire. Similar to Bernstein,
where the plaintiff's property was seized during the Nazi reign
throughout Europe, the Parthenon was stripped of the Sculptures
during the "grand tour." [R. 6.] Elgin's expeditions into the
Parthenon to seize the Sculptures caused "considerable damage to
the ancient structure." [R. 7.] His reckless removal of property
deprived Greece of rich history. Like Nazi takings, the Europeans
deprived a country of history. When a sovereign seizes property
outside its borders, it violates well-codified international law.
2. *2 7 This Court's resolution of a private adjudication
between museums will not have significant implications for
foreign relations.
This Court has noted that some aspect of international law
"touch more sharply on national nerves than do others."
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Moreover, the less important the
implications of an issue are for foreign relations, the weaker the
justification for exclusivity in the political branches. Braka v.
Bancomer, S.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d. Cir. 1985). Courts have
discretion to waive the doctrine if the case is not likely to impact
international relations or hinder the executive's hand in foreign
relations. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
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When assessing the validity of an act of state defense, a
court must assume the facts as alleged by the non-moving party.
Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. at 691. The party who is
seeking to invoke the act of state doctrine defense has the burden
of proving that the doctrine should be applied. Id. Further, courts
have declined to apply the doctrine in prior cases where a
defendant failed to show a direct relevance to foreign affairs. See
Id. at 706 (declining to expand the act of state doctrine to foreign
sovereigns that act in a purely commercial manner); see also
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1074
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine over
claims by agents of the Iranian government who acted as
representatives of private entities rather than in their official public
capacity); see also Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d.
117, 131 (2000) (finding that the case did not "interfere with the
laws and policies of the French government" because it involved
"private litigants for specific historical injury."). Courts apply the
doctrine narrowly and the defendant has a high burden in showing
that adjudication will touch upon a significant foreign affairs
matter.
Petitioner has not met its burden in this matter to show that
adjudicating this case would interfere with the separation of
powers in relation to foreign affairs. The record, as it stands now,
favors a court adjudicating the matter instead of the executive
branch. Adjudicating this case *28 will not affect foreign policy
with the Republic of Turkey since expropriation can be viewed as
a commercial transaction rather than a significant government
action. Lord Elgin's allowance to expropriate the Sculptures was
informal. Here, a United States court would not interfere with the
executive's role in foreign policy since the Acropolis Museum is
not challenging Turkish law. The Acropolis Museum merely
challenges the British Museum's refusal to return looted assets.
This Court adheres to the separation of powers doctrine by leaving
the executive branch to carry out large foreign matters and the
judiciary to decide commercial disputes between museums.
Although Lord Elgin's takings were allegedly warranted
through the Ottoman Sultan's issuance of firmans, his eventual
possession of the Sculptures resembles a private transaction
between parties, rather than an official act of a sovereign
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government. Although these firmans may have allowed takings in
1801, Lord Elgin's continued to seize the Sculptures until 1811.
[R. 7-8.] While it was Lord Elgin's original goal to only make
drawings and molds, he ended up seizing more sculptures than he
intended. [R. 6-7.] The volume of artifacts seized from the
Parthenon after the firmans were issued indicates significant
cultural history was taken outside the scope of any official
government action. The Sculptures are rightfully owned by the
Acropolis Museum, as they were unjustly expropriated. This Court
has the means to return this property to its rightful owners.
Foreign policy would be undisturbed by adjudication, and failure
to settle this matter in a United States court would hinder Greece's
historical and cultural preservation and the wellbeing of the
international museum community.
3. The Executive's diminished political interest and
Congress' distaste for the act of state doctrine advocate for
the return of the Sculptures through judicial action.
Under the flexible approach, a court will not grant the act
of state doctrine to a foreign sovereign defendant whenever its
expropriation action minimally touches upon foreign affairs. *29
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. Rather, it calls for a balancing test
that levies both sides and comes to a rational decision that would
not infringe on the individual rights of the political branches. Id.
at 428; Underhill, 493 U.S. at 409. The executive branch's
political interest significantly decreases when a sovereign's reign
ends and a new government comes to power. See Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 428. As in Bigio, there has been a shift towards not
applying the act of state doctrine here since the Ottoman Regime
ceased to exist over one hundred years ago. Thus, the third prong
of Sabbatino's balancing approach has been satisfied.
Congress cautioned against applying the act of state
doctrine by enacting 22 U.S.C. § 2370, or the Second
Hickenlooper Amendment, stating that courts must not apply the
doctrine to prevent against hearing expropriation cases. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2). The text provides:
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[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted.
Though situated in the broader context of furnishing
assistance to foreign states, the Second Hickenlooper Amendment
indicates Congressional aversion towards applying the act of state
doctrine in the expropriation context.
Courts should follow the flexible approach to the extant
and recognized criteria, since the degree of international law is
well established, foreign affairs will not be implicated, and the
regime that perpetuated the acts in question no longer exists.
Through changes in time and the sheer amount of international
transactions, courts have the means to resolve situations without
the worry of international disagreement. See First Nat 'l City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790-92 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). ("Although the act of state doctrine has a
long history ... there is debate over whether the doctrine is even
good policy, given that so many transactions in our modern world
are international and involve some act of a foreign *30
government."). Employing a flexible approach to the extant and
recognized prong is consistent with the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches' views on expropriation. Also, Petitioner has not
demonstrated foreign relations would be implicated under the
flexible approach.
C. Konowaloff Improperly Applied a Strict Reading of the Act
Of State Doctrine, Contrary to This Court's Precedent in
Sabbatino.
Konowaloff should not be the exemplary case in
determining whether the act of state doctrine should apply here.
The court's decision in Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum ofArt strays
from this Court's precedent in Sabbatino. 702 F.3d 140, 147 (2d
Cir. 2012). Konowaloff failed to consider a regime change, a
necessary countervailing factor weighing against the doctrine's
2016]
37
Cao et al.: 2016 NCHL Moot Court Competition Best Brief
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2019
132 DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol.XXVI:95
application. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; see also Chabad, 528
F.3d at 954 (noting other circuits "declined to apply the
doctrine... in reliance on a change in regime.").
Unlike Sabbatino, Konowaloff did not consider the
significance of a regime change and did not follow this Court's
guidance to balance countervailing factors that may weigh against
application of the act of state doctrine. In Konowaloff, the Second
Circuit stated the plaintiffs contention that the Soviet government
is no longer extant and recognized is not a "material" factor. Id.
There, a third party unjustly acquired the plaintiff's painting in a
decree that nationalized property after the Bolsheviks came in
power. Id. at 142. After the plaintiff unsuccessfully demanded
that the museum return the painting, he filed an action to recover
it. Id. The Museum moved for dismissal on the grounds that the
claim was barred by the act of state doctrine. Id. The plaintiffs
argument hinged on the premise that the Russian Federation was
now in power, instead of the Soviet Union, which collapsed and
was no longer extant and recognized. Id. at 144. The Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs contention that the act of state
doctrine should not be applied to foreclose his action on the
ground that the Soviet government is no longer extant. Id. at 147.
The Konowaloff court determined the regime change was not *31
material because the successor to the Soviet Union did not
renounce the predecessor government's appropriations. Id. While
the court observed that the present Russian government declined to
engage in further appropriations, the Soviet Union's failure to
repudiate led the court to uphold the act of state doctrine and
affirm the taking of the plaintiffs property. Id. at 148.
With the exception of Konowaloff, the judicial trend has
been to apply a flexible approach. The flexible approach applies
the doctrine narrowly, thus expanding a foreign government's
actions that a United States court will evaluate. [R. 21.] The
Konowaloff comparison is immaterial because the Second Circuit
did not correctly analyze the "extant and recognized" prong in the
balancing test. Further in Konowaloff, the court held that the act of
state doctrine was applicable even though the old regime had been
replaced, since the successor government had not repudiated the
challenged appropriations. The decision in Konowaloff not only
disregarded Sabbatino's requirements, but also improperly
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extended the requirement to include a repudiation. When applying
a strict approach, the court must end its inquiry once it establishes
that a government is no longer extant and recognized. A strict
approach fails to account for whether the foreign sovereign's old
form of government has dissolved materially. This Court has
never required a successor government to repudiate the actions of
its predecessor, and applying a strict approach strays from
Sabbatino' s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent Acropolis Museum
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision below and
find that (1) jurisdiction exists over the British Museum under the
FSIA, and (2) that the act of state doctrine does not preclude
adjudication of the matter.
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